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ABSTRACT 
Possibilistic logic is a quantitative method for uncertainty reasoning that is closely 
related to Zadeh's fuzzy set theory. In this paper, we formulate it as a kind of 
multimodal logic and develop some proof methods for it, including tableau method and 
two styles of natural deduction methods. The completeness and soundness of these 
methods are proved. Finally, some potential applications and the possible research 
directions are pointed out. 
KEYWORDS: Fuzzy set, possibilistic logic, modal logic, Kripke semantics, 
tableau method, natural deduction method 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last 30 years, many uncertainty reasoning schemes have been 
proposed by logicians, scientists and engineers. Among them, possibilistic 
logic, which is proposed by Dubois and Prade [1] and is closely related to 
Zadeh's fuzzy set theory [2], is one of the most important approaches. The 
logic arises naturally in the following scenario [3]. 
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Consider a state-descriptive information system (SDIS) ~ = (U, PV>, 
where U is the set of all possible states of the world under consideration, 
and PV is a set of propositional variables that describe some things about 
the world. For each u ~ U, assume that u is complete with respect o PV 
in the sense that for each p ~ PV, p is either true or false under the state 
u, we will write u(p) = 1 (resp. = 0) if p is true (resp. false) under state u. 
Then, the truth set of the proposition p, written as Ip[, is defined as the set 
of all states u such that u(p) = 1. Let us define a query formula f to the 
SDIS as a Boolean combination of the propositions in PV. The truth value 
of f under a state u is completely determined by the classical ogic truth 
table and the truth values of the propositional variables under u. Thus, the 
definition of the truth set can be extended to any queries accordingly. 
Now, if a piece of fuzzy information is stored in the SDIS, then the truth 
value of a formula f can be determined according to the stored informa- 
tion. A piece of fuzzy information /x is defined as a fuzzy subset (i.e., a 
possibility distribution) of U. Formally, Iz: U ---, [0, 1] is a piece of fuzzy 
information. The fuzzy information /~ is called normalized iff SUpu ~ v 
/z(u) -- 1. In general, we require the fuzzy information is normalized. 
In this case, two measures II and N: 2 U ~ [0, 1] are defined as follows, 
f l (X )  = sup/z(u) 
uEX 
N(X) = 1 - I I (U \X) .  
Let I I ( f )  = H(Ifl) and N(f) = N(Ifl), then the following properties hold 
for all formulas f,  f l ,  and f2: 
(i) I I ( f )  and N(f) ~ [0, 1] 
( i i )  N(f) = 1 - I I ( -~  f ) ,  
(iii) II( 7- ) = 1 and II( _1_ ) = 0, and 
(iv) I I(f l  V fz) = max(H(fl), H(fz)). 
By attaching two measures to classical ogic formulas, possibilistic logic 
is obtained. More specifically, if f is a well-formed formula (wff) of 
propositional logic, then (f(N c)) and ( f (H c)) where c ~ [0, 1] are wffs of 
possibilistic logic. When f is a classical clause, the wffs are called possi- 
bilistic clauses. The intended meanings of the wffs are N(f)>_ c and 
H( f )  >__ c respectively. Then, the resolution rule of possibilistic logic is 
defined between two possibilistic lauses as follows: 
(fwO (g w2) 
( /{(f ,  g) W 1 * W2) 
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where R(f, g) is the classical resolvent of f and g, and * is defined by 
(N c)*(N d) = (N min(c,d)) 
(Nc)*( I Id)  = / ( I Id )  i f c+d> 1 
(II0) i f c+d<l  
(II c)*( I I  d) = (II 0) 
By the axiom (iv) above, any wff of the form (f(Nc)) can be converted 
into an equivalent set of possibilistic lauses, so if only necessity measure 
N is concerned, the refutational completeness of this resolution rule can 
be proved [3]. However, if possibility-valued wffs are involved, then 
the completeness result does not hold in general. The following simple 
example will explain this point further. 
EXAMPLE 1.1 Consider the assumption set B -- {(p /x q(H 0.7), (p/x q 
r(N 0.6))} and the wff f = (r(II 0.7)) in possibilistic logic. Then obviously, 
f should be derivable from B. t However, since (p/x q(II 0.7)) is not a 
possibilistic clause, the resolution rule cannot be applied. A possible 
approach to overcome the difficulty may be to infer (p(II 0.7)) and (q(II 
0.7)) first. This indeed improves on some situations if the second sentence 
is either (p ~ r (N 0.6)) or (q ~ r(N 0.6)), but it is useless for the present 
example. 
To lift the restriction of clausal form, we must consider more general 
deduction methods. Some non-clausal deduction methods for modal ogics 
have been well studied by Fitting [4], so by formulating possibilistic 
reasoning as a kind of multimodal logic, we can generalize Fitting's 
methods to possibilistic logic. Recently, some modal formulations of possi- 
bilistic logic have been proposed [5, 6]. Here, we will review one of them, 
called quantitative modal logic (QML), and develop some nonclausal 
deduction methods for it. These include tableau methods and natural 
deduction methods. 
In what follows, we will first review the syntax and semantics of QML. 
Then the advantages of QML in possibilistic reasoning is discussed. A
basic theorem for the completeness of QML deduction methods, called 
model existence theorem, is proved in section 3. The above-mentioned 
proof methods are presented in section 4 and 5 sequentially. Finally, some 
related works are discussed and a brief conclusion is given. 
1Replacing "p A q" with a new propositional letter and using the given resolution rule will 
justify this. 
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2. QUANTITATIVE MODAL LOGIC 
2.1. Syntax 
To define a new logical language, we must specify its syntax and 
semantics. 
First, the alphabet of QML consists of logical constants, connectives and 
a (denumerable) set of propositional variables. 
• Logical constants: T (verum or truth constant) and _1_ (falsum or 
falsity constant). 
• Propositional variables: p, q, r , . . . ,  etc. 
• Classical connectives: --7 (negation), v (or), A (and), and 
(implication). 
• Quantitative modal operators: [c], (c), [c] +, and (c) + for all c 
[0, 1]. 2 
Second, the well-formed formulas (wffs) of QML are defined by the 
following recursive syntactic rules: 
• all propositional variables and logical constants are wffs, also called 
atomic formulas, 
• if fl and f2 are wffs, so are -~ fl,  fl A f2, fl V f2, and fl D f2, 
• if f is a wff, so are [c]f, (c ) f ,  [c]+f, and (c)+f for all c E [0, 1], 
• expressions except hose determined by above are not wffs. 
We usually use lowercase letters (sometimes with indices) p, q, r to denote 
atomic formulas and f, g, h to denote wffs. In the present case, wffs are 
also called sentences. Parentheses are punctuation symbols used to avoid 
ambiguity in the formation of wffs. The formula " f -  g" is taken as an 
abbreviation of " ( f  ~ g) A (g ~ f ) ."  
Now, we introduce some notations which will be used later. 
DEFINITION 2.1 Let S be a set of wffs. Then 
1. Define the positive subformula set of S, denoted by S +, as the smallest 
set containing S and being closed under the following conditions: 
(a) if ~ f, (c)f, (c) +f, [c]f, or [c ]+f~ S +, then f ~ S +. 
(b) i f f  Ag, fV  g, f Dg~S+,thenf ,  g~S +. 
2. Define the negation subformula set of S, denoted by S-, as the 
following set: 
S-= {~f l f~S+}.  
2Here, c is in fact a numeral designator representing a real number in [0, 1], not a number 
itself. However, we will not distinguish a number from the symbol representing it rigorously. 
Furthermore, to keep the language countable, we may restrict c to be a rational number. 
However, the results we will present still hold without such restriction. 
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0/ 0/1 0/2 
fag  f g 
~(fv  g) --~f ~g 
-~(f Dg) f -~g 
-7-~f f f 
3. Define Sub(S) = S+U S-. 
4. Define the parameter value set of S, V(S) as follows: 
V(S) = {c,1 - c [3f such that [c]f, (c) f ,  [c]+f, or 
(c)+f ~ Sub(S)} U {0,1}. 
Also, Sub(f) = Sub({f}) and V(f)  = V({f}) if f is a single wff. Note 
that if S is finite, then Sub(S) and V(S) are, too. Furthermore, an atomic 
wff or its negation is called a literal. 
Following the ideas in [4], we may classify the non-literal wffs of QML 
into six categories according to the formula's main connective that is used 
to combine its direct subformulas. The classification will simplify the 
presentation of definitions and theorems in section 3. We list the six 
categories of wffs and their corresponding subformulas in Tables 1-4. In 
each table, the original wffs appear in the left of the vertical ine and their 
corresponding subformula(s) in the right. For example, a wff of the form 
~( f  v g) is an a-formula, and its two components, called a I and a2, are 
f and -1 g respectively, while a wff -~[0.4]+p is a Ir(0.6)-formula, nd its 
component, called Ir0(0.6), is ~ p. 
2.2. Semantics 
Here we consider the semantics of QML. Define a possibility frame 
F = (W, R), where W is a set of possible words and R: W 2 ~ [0, 1] is a 
fuzzy accessibility relation on W. Let PV and FA denote the set of all 
propositional variables and the set of all wffs respectively. Then a model of 
QML is a triple M = (W, R, TA), where (W, R) is a possibility flame and 
Table 2. /3 Wffs and Their Component Formulas 
/3 /31 /32 
fvg  f g 
~(f  Ag) ~f  ~g 
fDg  ~f  g 
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v and v + Wffs (with Parameter c) and Their 
Component Formulas 
Vo(C) v+(c) v~(c) 
f [c]+f f 
~f  ~<1 - c) f  ~f  
TA: W × PV -o {0, 1} is a truth value assignment for all worlds. A proposi- 
tion p is said to be true in a world w iff TA(w, p) = 1. Given R, we can 
define a possibility distribution Rw for each w ~ W such that Rw(s) = 
R(w, s) for all s ~ W. Similarly, we can also define TA w for each w ~ W 
such that TAw(p) = TA(w, p) for all p ~ PV. Thus, mathematically, a 
model can be equivalently written as (W, (Rw, TAw )w ~ w ), and intuitively, 
TA w describes the ontological state of the world w, while R w reflects the 
epistemic state of the world w. 
Given a model M = (W,R,  TA), we can define the truth rela- 
tion ~M C_ W X FA as follows. First, for each world w and wff f ,  let 
Hw(f) = sup~ w{Rw(s)ls ~M f} and Nw(f) = 1 - Hw(-~ f )  
(1) W ~M P ~ TA(w, p) = 1, Vp ~ PV, 
(2) w ~:::::M "]- and w ~¢:M I , 
(3) w ~M ~ f "=" w ~:M f,  
(4) w [:::::M f A g ~, w ~M f and w I::::: M g, 
(5) w ~M f V g ¢* w ~M f or w ~M g' 
(6) WWM fDg~W~M ~f° r  WWM g, 
(7) w ~M (c ) f  ¢~ Hw(f)  > c, 
(8) w ~M (c)+f  ¢* Hw(f) > c, 
(9) w ~M [c]+f ¢~ Nw(f) > c, 
(10) w ~M [c]+f ¢~ Nw(f) > c. 
Clauses (7)-(10) define the meaning of wffs with modal operators. Intu- 
itively, [c]f (resp. [c]+f) means that N( f )> c (resp. N( f )> c), and 
similarly, (c ) f  (resp. (c)+f)  denotes that I I ( f )  > c (resp. I I ( f )  > c). 
Here, for convenience, we define sup O = 0 and inf Q = 1. 
A wff f is said to be valid in M = (W, R, TA), written ~M f iff for all 
w~ W,W~M f. If S is a set of wffs, then ~M S means that for all 
Table 4. 7r and ~-+ Wffs (with Parameter c) and Their 
Component Formulas 
~'(c) %(c) 
(c>f f 
~[1 - c]+f ~f 
~'+(c) ~(c) 
(c) +f f 
- , [1  - c]f -~f 
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f ~ S, ~u f- If C is a class of models and S is a set of wffs, then we write 
S ~c f to mean that for all M ~ C, ~M S implies ~M f. A model with 
finite possible worlds is called finite model. A model is called serial iff for 
all w in W, sups ~ w R(w, s) = 1, and reflexive iff for all w in W, R(w, w) = 
1. Throughout his paper, we use K, D, and T to denote the class of all 
models, serial models, and reflexive models. If C is a class of models, then 
FC denote the class of all finite models in C. We also note that T _ D c K. 
We can also see from the semantics that the main difference between 
QML and possibilistic logic is the former allow different possibility distri- 
butions for each world w, that is Rw, while the latter associate a constant 
possibility distribution to all worlds. Thus, we have enhanced the expres- 
sive power of standard possibilistic logic. For example, if from some 
information source, we get a rule "Smoking implies the possibility of 
cancer being at least 0.8," but the certainty (necessity) of the rule is at 
most 0.7 due to the realiability of the information source, then we can 
represent this fact as ~[0.7]+(p ~ (0.8)q), where p and q denote "smok- 
ing" and "being cancered" respectively. Furthermore, the syntax makes 
it easier to combine QML and other intensional logic. For instance, we 
can use B(0.6)p and (0.6)Bp to represent "the agent believes that the 
possibility of p is at least 0.6" and "the possibility of the agent believing p 
is at least 0.6" respectively. Recently, a complete axiomatic QML system 
for reasoning about higher order uncertainty has also been proposed [7]. 
This shows that QML has indeed some advantages on the representation 
of complex uncertainty wffs. 
2.3. QML and Possibilistic Reasoning 
To understand the relation between QML and possibilistic logic, we first 
show that all axioms for possibilistic logic can be realized in all serial 
models in the following sense. 
THEOREM 2.1 
(1) ~K [0]f A -~[1]+f A <0)f A ~<l>+f 
(2) ~K ([c]f A -7[c]+f) -- ((1 -- c>~fA ~(1 -- c) + ~f )  
(3) ~o (1 )T  and ~ ~(0)+± 
(4) ~K ([c](f A g) A -~[c]+(f A g)) - ([c]f A -~[c]+f A [c]g) V 
([c]g A ~[c]+g A [c]f) 
Proof The proof is nothing more than a direct expansion according to 
the above-defined semantics. [] 
Since D c K, Theorem 2.1 is valid in all serial models. According to the 
possible-world semantics, Theorem 2.1. exactly corresponds to the four 
axioms for possibility and necessity measured in Section 1. Note that 
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Theorem 2.1. (4) says that N( f  /x g) = c iff (N( f )  = c and N(g)  >_ c) or 
(N(g)  = c and N( f )  >_ c), i.e., N( f  A g) -- c iff min(N(f) ,  N(g)) = 
c, which is equivalent to say that I I ( f  v g )= max(II(f), II(g)), since 
N( f )  = 1 - II(-~ f).  Thus, the consequence relation in serial models is 
exactly suitable for possibilistic reasoning. But how about K and T? Recall 
that we can define a possibility distribution R w for each world w in a 
possible world model according to its accessibility relation R, then the 
seriality of a model is equivalent to the normalization of all its correspond- 
ing possibility distribution. 3 Since the normalization requirement is what 
Dubois et al. [8] impose on the semantics of possibilistic logic, the conse- 
quence relation in K is just the result of lifting this constraint. Thus, 
though the consequence r lation for K is too weak for possibilistic reason- 
ing, it can tell us which theorems of possibilistic logic may be derived 
without the normalization requirement. As for T, since all reflexive models 
are also serial, we can do possibilistic reasoning by ~T" However, why the 
stronger consequence relation ~T is useful? To understand this, let us 
generalize the notion of reflexivity. Given e ~ [0, 1], we define a model 
(W,R ,  TA) as e-reflexive iff Vw ~ W, R(w,w)> e. We then have the 
following axiom AXT e which is valid in all e-reflexive models. 
AXT~: [1 - e]+fDf 
In general, AXT 1 e is called e-threshold axiom. It is named so because we 
accept a wff as true when its necessity measure is greater than e. Then 
AXT1, the strongest hreshold axiom, i.e., 0-threshold axiom, is valid in all 
reflexive models. Although the results we will present for T may be 
generalized to any e-reflexive models, to keep simplicity and facilitate the 
comparison with ordinary modal logic, we will prove these results in T 
directly. 
3. MODEL EXISTENCE THEOREM 
The model existence theorem provides a powerful tool to the proof of 
completeness for many formal systems, in particular, for those without 
compactness, such as the infinitary logic L~o~o , [9]. Fitting first gives a 
systemic presentation of the model existence theorem for modal logic, and 
proves many important results using this theorem [4]. Interestingly, by 
modifying Fitting's argument, many results for ordinary modal logic may 
be transferred to QML without too much distortion. 
3A possibility distribution P: W ~ [0, 1] is normalized iff supw ~ rv P (w)  = 1. 
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The central idea of the model existence theorem is the so-called consis- 
tency property. To define it, we need the following functions. Throughout 
this section, let F = Sub(G) for some finite set of wffs, G. Also recall the 
notation V(F)  from Section 2, and let a,/3, v(c), v+(c), 7r(c), ~'+(c) denote 
a wff in the corresponding categories respectively. 
DEFINITION 3.1 Define the world-alternatiue function K and strict world- 
alternatit,e function K + on F as follows. 
K, K+: 2 F × V(F)  --, 2 F, 
K (S ,c )  = (Vo(C')lc' > c, v(c ')  ~ S} 
u{v;  (c') lc'  >_ c, v+(c ') e S} 
and 
K+(S,c )  = {Vo(C')lc' > c, v(c ' )  ~ S} 
U { v; (c') lc'  >__ c, v + (c ') ~ S}. 
Intuitively, K(S, c) (resp. K+(S, c)) contains all wffs f such that N( f )  >_ 
c (resp. N( f )  > c) can be derived from S by using only duality property of 
N and II (i.e., axiom (ii) of Section 1) and the transitivity of inequality 
relation. 
DEFINITION 3.2 Let 0 c 2 F be a collection of subsets ofF.  Then 
(1) O is called a classical consistency property of F iff for all S E O, S 
satisfies the following three conditions: 
(a) a e S. ~ S U {a l ,  Of 2} ~ 19, 
(b) /3~S~SU{/31} ~19,orSU{/32  } ~19, and 
(c) for any atomic wff p, S does not contain p and -7 p simul- 
taneously, and none of the following wffs are in S: v+(1), 
~-+(1), -~ T, J_. 
(2) A classical consistency property 19 is a K-consistency property iff for 
all S ~ 19, S satisfies, in addition to (a)-(c), the following two 
conditions: 
(kl) c > 0 and ~(c)  ~ S ~ K+(S, 1 - c) U {Tr0(c)} ~ 19, and 
(k2) 7r+(c) ~ S ~ K(S, 1 - c) U {Tr;(c)} ~ 19. 
(3) A T-consistency property is a K-consistency property with the follow- 
ing condition: 
(t) VS ~ ®,f~K+(S ,O)  ~ S u {f} ~ (9. 
(4) A D-consistency property is a K-consistency property with the follow- 
ing condition: 
(d)L VS ~ 19, K+(S,O) ~ 19. 
Let B _ F and L = K, T or D, then an L-consistency property ® is 
called B-compatible iff for all S ~ 19, and f ~ B, S u {f} ~ 19. 
336 Chum Jung Liau and Bertrand I-Peng Lin 
It can be checked that for any wff f, if f ~ F, then the corresponding 
component formulas fl and f2 (in the case of f being a or/3 wff) or f0 
(in the other cases) are all in F by the requirement of F = Sub(G). This 
simple fact is critical to the well-definedness of the consistency property 
since we require that O is a subset of 2 e. 
Obviously, the consistency property is closely related to the satisfiability 
of wffs. The intuition is formally stated as the following theorem. However, 
before the presentation of the main theorem, let us illustrate these 
definitions with a simple example. 
EXAMPLE 3.1 If O is a K-consistency property and S = {(0.7)pl, 
[0.4]p2, [0.3]+P3} ~ O, then from the consistency of S, we can infer that 
there is a model M = (W, R, TA) and a world w ~ W such that w ~ S. 
Since w ~ (0.7)pl, under the assumption that W is finite (an assumption 
which can be made without loss of generality by Corollary 3.1.), there 
exists another world u such that R(w, u) > 0.7 and u ~ Pl. Now, because 
w ~ [0.4]p2 A [0.3]+P3, we have Nw(p2) > 0.4 and Nw(P3) > 0.3, i.e., 
IIw(--np2) < 0.6 and I-Iw(--np3) < 0.7, so for u ~ W such that R(w,u)  > 
0.7, we have u ~ P2/x P3- Thus, u ~ K÷(S, 0.3) U {Pl} since K÷(S, 0.3) = 
{P2, P3}. That is, K÷(S, 0.3) U {Pl} should be also consistent. This explains 
the (kl) condition of definition 3.2(2). Other conditions of consistency 
properties can be explained essentially in the same way. 
THEOREM 3.1 (Model Existence Theorem) Let L = K, T, or D. I f  F is 
finite, B c_ F, and 19 is a B-compatible L-consistency property on F, then 
there exists a finite model M = (IV, R, TA) in L such that ~M B and for 
all f ~ S ~ O, there exists a world w ~ W such that w ~ f. 
Proof To prove this theorem, we use a constructive argument. First, 
noting that O is ordered by __c_ and all elements of O is finite sets, we can 
construct he model M o = (IV, R, TA) as follows: 
W: the set of maximal members in O, 
TA(S, p) = 1 ~, p ~ S, VS ~ W and p ~ PV, and 
R must satisfy that for all S, S' ~ W, and c ~ V(F): 
(rl) if c ~ 0, then K(S, c) c_ S' ~ R(S, S')  > 1 - c 
(r2) K÷(S, c) c_ S' ~ R(S, S') > 1 - c. 
Then, we use a series of lemmas to show that M o is well-defined and 
satisfies the requirement of the theorem. 
LEMMA 3.1 There exists R satisfying (r l)  and (r2). 
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Proof According to Definition 3.1., we have the following results for all 
S ~ 2 F and c, c' ~ V(F): 
(i) K+(S, c) c_ K(S, c), 
(ii) if c > c', then K(S, c) c_ K(S, c'), 
(iii) if c > c', then K+(S, c) c_ K+(S, c'), and 
(iv) if c > c', then K(S, c) c_ K+(S, c') 
Let V (F )={c  1,c 2,c 3 . . . .  ,cn,} such that 1 =c l  >c  z>c  3> -.- > 
cn = 0. Then, we have the following inclusion chain for any S ~ 2F: 
Q~ = K+(S, Cl) c_K(S, Cl) c_ ... c__g+(S, ci) c_K(s, ci) 
c_K+(S, ci+l) c_ ... c_K+(S, cn) 
Thus, given S and S', there are three possible cases: 
Case 1: for some i such that 1 < i < n - 1, K+(S,c i) c_ S' and K(S, 
ci) c+ S'. In this case, the only value of R(S, S') which satisfies 
the conditions (rl) and (r2) is 1 - c i. 
Case 2: for some i such that 1 <i<n-1 ,  K(S,c i) KS'  and K + 
(S, c i+l )~S' .  In this case, if 1 -c i<R(S ,S ' )< 1-c i+ 1) 
then (rl) and (r2) can be satisfied. 
if K+(S, c,) c_ S', then R(S, S') = 1 [] 
3.2 If 19 is a T-consistency property, then M o is a reflexive 
Case 3: 
LEMMA 
model. 
Proof 
condition 
Since any S in W is the maximal member of 19, then by 
(t), we have K+(S,0) ___ S, and this implies R(S, S) = 1 by (r2). 
[] 
LEMMA 3.3 If 19 is a D-consistency property, then M o is a serial model. 
Proof Since for any S in W, K+(S,O) ~ 19 by condition (d), and each 
element of 19 is a finite set, we can find the maximal extension of K+(S, 0), 
say S', in 19. Then S' ~W,  and K+(S,O) c_S ', so R(S ,S ' )= I  and 
SUps,~w R(S,S') = 1. [] 
LEMMA3.4 For any S ~ W and wff f ~ S, S ~Mo f" 
Proof By induction on the structure of f. Note here S refers both to a 
set of wffs and a world in model M o. For convenience, we drop the 
subscript M o in the following proof, and write S ~ f only to mean that f 
is true in the world S. We consider the following exhaustive cases. 
Case 1: f is an atomic wff. By the definition of M o, TA(S, f )  -- 1, since 
f ~ S. Thus, S ~ f according to the possible world semantics. 
Case 2: f = -7 p for some atomic wff p. By condition (c) of Definition 
3.2, --1 p ~ S implies p ~ S, and so TA(S, p) = 0. This in turn 
implies S ~ f. 
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Case 3: f is an o~ wff. Then S U {a 1, O~2} E O, and since S is a 
maximal member of O, this means a], a2 ~ S. By induction 
hypothesis, S ~ a 1 and S ~ ce2, so S ~ f. 
Case 4: f i sa  /3 wff. Then Su{ i l l}  ~t9  orSU{f l z}  ~19,soS~f l t  
or S ~/3 2 by the maximality of S. Thus, S ~ f. 
Case 5: f is a 7r(c) wff with c>0.  (Note that if c=0,  S~ 7r(c) 
naturally). Then K+(S, 1 - c) u {Tr0(c)} ~ 19, so let S' be the 
maximal extension of K+(S, 1 -c )U  {Tr0(c)} in 19, we have 
R(S, S') > c since K+(S, 1 - c) c_ S'. Furthermore, 7r0(c) 
S', so S' ~ 7to(c) by induction hypothesis. Thus, S ~ f,  by the 
definition of 7r0(c) wffs and their semantics. 
Case 6: f is a 7r+(c) wff with c < 1. (Note that if c = 1, then 7r+(1) 
S). This case is similar to case 5. 
Case 7: f is a u(c) wff. Let S' be an element of IF. If S' ~ ~ Uo(C), 
then uo(c)~ S' by induction hypothesis. This implies K(S, 
c) ~ S' since Uo(C) ~ K(s, c) by definition, and in turn 1 - 
R(S, S') > c by the definition of M o. Thus we have inf{1 - 
R(S,S')IS' ~ ~Vo(c),S' ~ W} > c, i.e., S ~f .  
Case 8: f is a u+(c) wff. The proof is similar to that of Case 7, except 
that the property of W being finite is used. [] 
Note that our induction basis are literals (i.e., Case 1 and 2), not just 
atomic formulas, so we can infer the results in all other cases. 
Now, we can complete the proof of the model existence theorem. First, 
since 19 is B-compatible, we have B c S for any S ~ W, by the maximality 
of S. Thus for all S ~ IF, S ~ f if f ~ B by Lemma 3.4. That is, ~Mo B. 
Moreover, since for all f ~ S ~ 19, there exists a maximal extension of S, 
say S', in IF, so S' ~f  by Lemma 3.4. Finally, W is finie and M o is a 
model in L when 19 is an L-consistency property by Lemma 3.2. and 3.3. 
[] 
The following corollary is proved in [6] by the soundness and 
completeness of the axiomatic systems. 
COROLLARY 3.1 B I-- L f '~ B ~L f ¢* B ~FL f 
This corollary is useful in the correctness of proof methods developed 
later and in the proof of the decidability theorem for QML. We will only 
consider the decidability theorem in this section, and devote the following 
sections to the development of the proof methods. As above, we assume 
L = K, T, or D, and let B be a finite set of wffs, f be a wff, and 
F = Sub(B u {f}). 
LEMMA 3.5 B ~L f iff there exists a B-compatible L-consistency property 
0 on F such that { -~ f} ~ O. 
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Proof (~  part) This is just a restatement of Theorem 3.1. 
(=~ part) B ~:L f implies B ~FL f by Corollary 3.1. This in turn implies 
the existence of a finite L-model M = (W, R, TA) such that ~m S and 
w ~M TM f for some w ~ W. We can define O as follows: 
O : {S c FIw ~M S, w ~ W} 
We can show that O is a B-compatible L-consistency property. Then, by 
the definition of O, we have {-1 f} ~ O. As for the process of verifying 
that 19 satisfies the appropriate conditions in Definition 3.2., it is routine. 
We only point out that the finiteness of M is used in the verification of 
condition (kl) and (d), and leave the detail to the reader. [] 
THEOREM 3.2 The problem "B ~L f?"  is decidable. 
Proof Since F is finite, we can test each subset O of 2F to see whether 
it is a B-compatible L-consistency property (by checking the appropri- 
ate conditions in Definition 3.2.) and whether {7 f} ~ O (by member- 
ship test). Since each test step is decidable and the process is finitely 
terminating, the problem is decidable. [] 
4. TABLEAU METHOD FOR ANALYTIC SYSTEMS 
Let L = K, D, or T. Define the analytic system L as the set of all wffs f 
such that ~L f" The remainder of the paper is devoted to the develop- 
ment of different proof methods for analytic systems. In this section, we 
first consider the tableau method. This is essentially a proof-tree construc- 
tion approach. In this method, an attempted proof of a wff is to place the 
negated form of the wff as the root of the proof tree, and tableau rules are 
applied to extend the branches of the tree until some closed condition is 
encountered, or no more rules are applicable. Then, if all branches of the 
tree are closed, then the wff is proved as a theorem of the system. 
Otherwise, an open branch of the tree will construct a counter-model of
the wff. In fact, in the presentation of Fitting's tableau method for 
ordinary modal logic [4], the model existence theorem is derived intuitively 
from the method by considering the consistency property as the collection 
of possible open branches. The main feature of the analytic systems is that 
the tableau rules are completely dependent on the component formulas of 
the parent node. Thus, if we label nodes of the proof tree by the wffs 
derived according to the rules, every node of the proof tree is labeled by a 
wff in Sub(f), where f is the label of the root. Consequently, the proof 
tree is finite, and the proof process will terminate. These systems are 
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named as analytic just because we can derive the proof of a theorem by 
analyzing the structure (i.e., the subformulas) of the theorem to be proved. 
4.1 Tableau Method for Propositional Logic 
In Smullyan [10], the tableau methods for propositional logic have been 
extensively developed. Then, Fitting [4] successfully extends the method to 
modal logic. Here, we first recall Smullyan's method. Then in the next 
subsection, we prove the soundness and completeness of the tableau 
method for QML's analytic systems. 
Smullyan's method consists of a set of tableau rules. When some branch 
of the proof tree contains the premises of some rule, the conclusions of the 
rule can be added to end of the branch. Essentially, there are two kinds of 
rules. The first ones, the extension rules, are to add the conclusions to the 
end of a branch directly, and the added nodes are organized as a branch 
and attached to the end of the original branch. The second ones, the 
forking rules, are to add the conclusions as the sons of the end node of the 
original branch. In the propositional case, all forking rules have exactly 
two conclusions, so one is the left son and the other is the right son, and 
our proof tree is binary. The tableau rules for propositional logic [4] are 
presented in Figure 1. 
Observing that all premises of the extension rules are a wffs and all 
premises of the forking rules are /3 wffs, we can summarize the tableau 
rules of propositional logic into two rules in accordance with the classifi- 
cation of propositional wffs. In other words, the tableau rules are the 
following o~ and /3 rules. 
a rule: ~ /3 rule: /3 
0/20L1 /31I/32 
Now, a tableau (or a proof tree) is a labeled binary tree whose nodes are 
labeled by wffs. For convenience, we identify the nodes of a tableau with 
1. Extension rules: 
A: fag  ~ V : -~( fvg)  -~--: -~-~f -7 D: -~(fDg) 
f - f  f f 
g -Tg g 
2. Forking rules: 
v: fvg  -7 A : ~( fAg)  D: f~g 
fig ~ fl ~ g -, f ig 
Figure 1. The tableau rules for propositional logic. ([4]) 
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their labels. A tableau rule is applicable to a tableau when some branch of 
the tableau contains the premise of the rule. After the application of an a 
rule, the new tableau is obtained by attaching the conclusions to the end of 
the branch to which the rule is applied, where one conclusion is the son 
of the old branch end, and the other conclusion is the grandson of it. After 
applying a /3 rule, the new tableau is obtained by attaching the two 
conclusions as the left and right son of the old branch end. Thus, a tableau 
rule transforms an old tableau into a new one. However, the transforma- 
tion is nondeterministic, i.e., there may be many rules applicable to a 
tableau in the same time and one real application of them results in the 
new tableau. A derivation is thus a sequence of tableaus T 1, T 2 . . . . .  T n 
such that T 1 is a single node (called the root) tree, and T~ is the resultant 
tableau of applying some rule that is applicable to T,._ 1 for each 1 < i < n. 
A branch in a tableau is called (classically) closed if it satisfies one of the 
following three conditions: 
• It contains p and -7 p for some propositional variable p 
• It contains _L 
• It contains -~ ~- 
A tableau is called (classically) closed if each branch of it is closed. A 
tableau proof for a wff f is a derivation T1, T 2 . . . . .  Tn such that T 1 is a 
single node labeled as --7 f and T~ is closed. We will use ~PL' f to mean 
that there exists one tableau proof for f. 
4.2. Tableau Methods for QML Analytic Systems 
The tableau method for propositional logic is also called semantic 
tableau method because the tableau rules reflect the truth conditions of 
any wffs in a given world. For example, a rule means an a wff is true in a 
world iff its component wffs are both true in the world. However, when we 
turn to QML, we will need to consider the truth condition of wffs in 
different worlds. For example, by possible world semantics, if (0.5)÷f is 
true in a world w, then there exists one world w' such that R(w,w') > 0.5 
and f is true in w'. Thus, we need to process the truth set in different 
possible worlds. 
The most obvious approach is to allow the creation of alternate tableaus 
during the course of a derivation. This may be accomplished by allowing 
the nesting of tableaus, and the resultant proof procedure is just a 
combination of tableau method for propositional logic and the recursive 
call mechanism. In other words, we start with an attempted proof of a wff 
in QML, and the classical tableau rules are applied unproblematically, but 
when a modal wff is derived in the course, we may also switch to an 
alternate world, and the proof is continued in the altemate world. The 
difficulty of this method is that we need to keep a lot of alternate tableaus 
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in the same time, and the proof will get rather complex even a simple wff 
is given at the beginning of the proof. 
Fortunately, for the analytic systems, having jumped from one world to 
another, we do not need to go back again. This suggests that in the tableau 
methods for these systems, if we create an alternate tableau at some point 
in the course of a derivation, we can forget about the earlier tableau to 
which it is an alternate. Thus we only need to consider a single tableau at 
any given time. 
Observing this, Fitting suggests a further simplification. Rather than 
actually creating alternate tableaus and discarding the old tableau, we 
could simply update the original one to reflect conditions in each current 
world as we pass through it. This saves the time to duplicate the common 
parts of the old and the new tableaus. However, what might these updating 
rules be like. Consider the wff (0.5)+f occurring on a branch of a tableau. 
Intuitively, the wff is true in the current world w under consideration. 
Thus, there should be a world w' such that R(w, w') > 0.5 and f is true in 
w'. Suppose we want to update the branch to reflect a jump from the world 
w to w'. Then, obviously, we should add f to the end of the branch. But 
the question is, in general what additional information may we take with 
us in such a jump? The answers may be different for different logics. In 
the case of the system K, let S be the set of wffs occurring on the branch 
to be modified, then by the definition of possible world semantics, K(S, 0.5) 
should be all true in the world w'. Thus, we should cross out all wffs in this 
branch and add K(S, 0.5) U {f} to the end of it. In some cases the wffs to 
be added is a subset of the original branch. In those cases, we just cross 
out the unnecessary wffs, and remain the needed wffs. 
However, because of the way of the tableaus being written as a tree, it 
may happen that a branch is to be modified and part of it is common to 
several other branches that are not to be modified. In this case one can 
add to the ends of the branches that are not to be altered fresh occur- 
rences of the wffs that will be crossed out, then the above-mentioned 
process of crossing-out and addition can be executed unproblematically. 
Thus, in addition to the a and /3 rules, QML analytic systems contains 
tableau rules listed in Figure 2. 
We can use the classification of wffs to simplify the presentation of the 
tableau rules as follows: 
1. ~r rules 
S, #(c) 
#(c): (c > O) 
K+(S ,  1 - c) ,  #o(C) 
S, #+ (c) 
#+(c): 
K(S, 1 - c), "rr] (c) 
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1. Common Rules to K, D, and T: 
(a) If c > 0, then 
(c): S, (c ) f  711-c1+:  S ,~[ I  - c ]+f  
K+(S,1 - c ) , f  K+(S,1 - c), ~f  
(b) If c > O, then 
(c)+: S,(c)+f  711 -c ] :  S, -~[1 - c l f  
K(S,1 - c ) , f  K(S, I  - c), ~f  
2. Special Rules for D and T: 
(a) Rule for D 
K+(S,0) 
(b) Rule for T 
i. If c > 0, then 
[c]: [clf -~(1 - c)+: -~(1 - c)+f 
f ~f  
ii. If c > O, then 
[c]+: [c]+f ~( l - c ) :  -~(1 -c ) f  
f -~f 
Figure 2. Tableau rules for QML analytic systems. 
2. v rule for D: 
3. v rule for T: 
S 
K + (S, 0) 
v(c): (c > 0) v(c) v+(c): v+(c) 
,'0(c) .~ (c) 
Now, we have three kind of rules for QML tableau method. The first 
ones are the extension rules that include a rules and the v rules for the 
system T. The second ones are the forking rules that include /3 rules. The 
last ones are the modification rules that include rr rules and the v rule for 
the system D. The applicability condition of these rules are same. A rule is 
applicable to a tableau iff the uncrossed-out nodes in some branch of the 
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tableau contains all premises of that rule. However, the effect of these 
rules are very different. The effect of extension and forking rules have 
been described in the preceding subsection. Let S and C denote the 
premise and conclusion set of a modification rule respectively. If some 
branch of a tableau contains S, and let P be the set of all wffs on that 
branch, then the resultant ableau after applying the modification rule to 
that branch of the tableau is obtained as follows. First, for each wff in 
P \ C, add a new copy of the wff to the end of all other branches to which 
the wff belongs, and cross out all wffs in P \ C on the branch to be 
modified. Then, the wffs in C \P  is organized as a new branch and 
attached to the end of the modified branch. 
The definition of a derivation is same as that for propositional logic, and 
a branch is called closed iff it is classically closed or it satisfies one of the 
following two conditions: 
• It contains [1]+f, or (1)+f. 
• It contains -1 [0]f, or --1 (0)f .  
Let B be a set of wffs. Then the global assumption rule with B is: under 
any condition, the element of B may be added to the end of any branches 
of a tableau. Let L = K, D, or T. We say that f is provable with global 
assumption B in system L by tableau method, written as B ~-/j f ,  iff there 
a derivation of a closed tableau from a single node --1 f by tableau rules 
for L and the global assumption rule with B. 
Next, we will construct he correctness and completeness of the tableau 
methods. But before continuing, let us consider a rule in some details to 
see why the tableau rules are correct intuitively. Consider the (c )  + rule. 
The premises of the rule are S u {(c)+f}, i.e., the wffs in this set are true 
in some world w. This implies that there exists a world w' such that 
R(w, w' )> c and f is true in w' since by definition, SUpu~w{R(w, u)l
u ~M f} > C. However, any wff g in the set K(S, 1 - c) satisfies that 
[1 - c]g is true in w since by the premises S is true in w. This in turn 
implies that for any world u such that u ~M -~ g, R(w, u) <_ c. Thus -7 g 
must be false in w', i.e., g is true in w' for any wff g in K(S, 1 - c). This 
argument verifies that there exists one world such that the conclusions of 
the (c )  + are true in it. However, the problem arises when we consider the 
(c )  rule since supu ~ w{R(w, u)lu ~M f} > C does not imply the existence 
of a world w' such that R(w, w') > c if the set W is infinite. Fortunately, 
we have Corollary 3.1., which tells us that it is sufficient o consider only 
finite models. 
To construct the soundness result, we need some definitions. Let L = K, 
D, T, and S be a set of wffs. Then S is called finitely L-satisfiable under 
assumption B iff there exists a finite model M = (W, R, TA) in L such 
that ~t  B and there exists a world w ~ W such that w WM S. A branch 
of a tableau is finitely L-satisfiable under assumption B iff the set of 
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uncrossed-out wffs on it is. A tableau is finitely L-satisfiable under 
assumption B iff one branch of it is so. We now have the following lemma. 
LEMMA 4.1 Let L = K, D, or T. I f  T 1 and T 2 are two tableaus and T 2 is 
the result of applying some tableau rule for L to T 1, then T 2 is finitely 
L-satisfiable under assumption B if T 1 is, where B is the set with which the 
global assumption rule is applied. 
Proof Suppose T 1 is finitely L-satisfiable under B, then there exists 
one branch of it finitely L-satisfiable under B. If T 2 is obtained from T 1 by 
applying some tableau rule to any branch except hat branch, then obvi- 
ously, that branch remains satisfiable in the original model, and the result 
follows. Now, if the rule is exactly applied to that branch, then there are 
some cases to be considered. Let M = (W, R, TA) be a finite L-model 
such that ~M B and w be a world in W such that the uncrossed-out wffs 
on the branch are true in it. Then 
a rules: the new branch extending the original one with a 1 and o/2 is 
still true in w since a is. 
/3 rules: the new branch extending the original one with /31 or that 
extending with /32 are true in w since /3 is. 
7r(c) rules: the set of uncrossed-out wffs on the original branch contains 
S u {rr(c)}, so by assumption w ~M S U {Tr(c)}. Since W is finite 
and c > 0, this means there exists one world w' such that w' ~u 
7r0(c) and R(w,w' )> c. This in turn implies w' ~A4 + K+(S, 1 - 
c) U {Tr0(c)}. Since the uncrossed-out wffs on the modified branch in 
tableau T 2 are exactly the wffs in this conclusion set, this means 
tableau T 2 is also finitely L-satisfiable under assumption B. The 
witness is the model M and the new world w'. 
~-+(c) rules: the proof is similar as above. 
u rule in D: in this case, M is assumed to be a finite serial model. The 
property of seriality and finiteness implies that there exists a world w' 
in W such that R(w,w')  = 1. This results in w' ~ K+(S,O) since 
w ~M S. Thus the modified branch in the new tableau T 2 wits the 
fact that T 2 is finitely D-satisfiable under assumption B. 
v(c) rule in T: in this case, M is assumed to be a reflexive model. Since 
W [:::::M /](C) and c > 0, then by reflexivity of M, we have w I::::: M lp0(c). 
Thus the extended branch in the tbleau T 2 is true in w. 
v+(c) rule in T: the proof is similar as above. 
global assumption rule with B: since the wffs in B are true in all worlds 
in W, the extended branch wits the finite L-satisfiability of T 2. [] 
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THEOREM 4.1 (Soundness theorem of tableau method for analytic sys- 
tems) Let L = K, D, or T, and B be a finite set of wffs, then B H L, f 
implies B ~L f 
Proof If B ~-L' f and B ~:L f, then there exists a finite model M = 
(W, R, TA) in L and a world w ~ W such that ~u B and w ~u ~ f by 
corollary 3.1. This fact results in the initial tableau with a single node -7 f 
is finitely L-satisfiable under assumption B, then by applying the above 
lemma repeatedly until the dosed tableau is derived. However, it is 
impossible for a closed tableau to be finitely L-satisfiable under assumption 
B, so a contradiction follows. [] 
We can now turn to the completeness of the analytic systems. Suppose S 
is a finite set of wffs, then an L-tableau for S under assumption B is any 
tableau that begins with a single branch consists of all wffs in S and 
continues by applications of a,/3, ~-, ~, rules for L, and global assumption 
rule with B. S is called L-consistent under B if no L-tableaus for S are 
closed. 
THEOREM 4.2 (Completeness theorem of tableau method for analytic 
systems) Let L = K, D, or T, and B be a finite set of wffs. Then B ~L f 
implies B H L, f" 
Proof Define 
0 = {SIS c_ Sub(B U {f}), S is L-consistent under B}. 
We will show that O is B-compatible L-consistency property by verifying 
that O satisfies the conditions in Definition 3.2. Let S ~ O, then there are 
no closed tableaus for S under B. Thus, we have 
(a) if a ~ S and S u {al, a 2} ~ ®, then there is a closed tableau for 
the second set. But we can apply a rule to S first and the resultant 
tableau is a single branch containing all wffs in S u {aa, a2}- 
Consequently, there is a closed tableau for S after all, and this is a 
contradiction. 
(b) If /3 ~ S, S t_J {/31} ~ O, and S U {/32} ~i~ ~), then there are closed 
tableaus for S U {/31} and S U {/32} respectively. Then we can 
apply /3 rule to the initial tableau for S, and then derive the two 
closed tableaus for the two branches respectively. Since in our 
modification rules, the part to be crossed out which is common to 
other branches is copied to those branches, the derivation of the 
two branches do not interfere with each other. Thus the final 
tableau is a closed tableau for S. 
(c) if S contains ±, ~ T, ~r+(1), or u+(1), then the initial tableau of 
S is just a closed tableau for it. 
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(kl) if c > 0 and 7r(c) e S, then we can apply ~r(c) rule to the initial 
tableau of S and the resultant tableau is just K+(S, 1 -c )u  
{Tr0(c)}. Since S has no closed tableau, K+(S, 1 - c) U {~r(c)} has 
not, either. Thus, K+(S, 1 - c) U {~r0(c)} E O. 
(k2) the condition is verified analogously. 
(d) apply the u rule for D to the initial tableau for S, the resultant 
tableau is K+(S,O), and so K+(S,O) ~ 0 since S has no closed 
D-tableau. 
(t) if f~  K+(S,O), then f= Uo(C)(C > 0) or f=  v~(c) for some 
u(c)(c > 0) or v*(c) ~ S, so we can apply the v(c) or u+(c) rule 
for T to attach f to the end of the initial tableau for S. Since S 
has no closed tableaus, S u {f} ~ O. 
Finally, because of the global assumption rule with B, ® is B-compatible. 
Now, if B ~L, f, then {--1 f} ~ O, so by the model existence theorem, 
B ~L f. [] 
5. NATURAL DEDUCTION METHODS 
Natural deduction methods are also important proof methods that have 
been extensively used in classical ogic [11]. In general, the natural deduc- 
tion method is a kind of forward reasoning method in which we deduce 
conclusions from some assumptions, and then these assumptions are 
discharged according to some deduction rules. The final form of the 
conclusion may be a conditional sentence. Thus, the main characteristic 
feature of natural deduction methods is that we can make assumptions at 
any point of the deduction process, deduce things from them, and later 
discharge the assumptions. 
According to the description above, the natural deduction system will 
contain some assumption-discharging rules. Generally, the rules of a 
natural deduction system may be classified into two kinds. One is the 
elimination rules in which the conclusions are structurally simpler than the 
premises because of the elimination of some connectives. The other is 
the introduction rules in which the conclusions are structurally more 
complicated than the premises because of the introduction of connectives. 
The rules to discharge assumptions are in general a kind of introduction 
rules since discharging some assumptions will make the conclusion more 
complex to express the assumptions explicitly in the conclusion. 
There are different formats to express a natural deduction proof. Here 
we will choose the one developed by Fitting [4] for modal logic and modify 
it to meet our need. 
First, a deduction is a sequence of wffs in boxes. The first item in a box 
is an assumption and other wffs in a box are derived according to the rules 
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of the natural deduction systems. The boxes may be nested. When a new 
assumption is introduced, a new box must be created, with that assumption 
as the first item of the created box. On the other hand, when an assump- 
tion is discharged by the assumption-discharge ules, a box created for the 
assumption should be closed off, and the conclusion is written just below 
the box. A natural deduction proof (abbreviated as proof throughout this 
section) is a deduction in which all assumptions have been discharged. 
Although the boxes may be nested, they should not be overlapped. In 
other words, a box should be closed off only when all boxes inside it have 
been closed off. A wff f and a box B are said to be at the same nest level if 
B and f are inside the same box directly. Here, "directly inside a box B" 
means "inside B, but not inside any boxes inside B." 
The natural deduction rules for classical logic [4] is presented in 
Figure 3. 
The last line of a proof is the wff that have been proved by the 
deduction. The global assumption rule with a set of wffs B is that any 
member of B may be used as a line at any point of the deduction. We 
write B ~-PL, f to denote that there is a proof of the wrr f with the global 
assumption B in the classical natural deduction system. Some important 
properties of classical natural deduction system have been studied exten- 
sively. We restate some of them from [4] for the sake of reference. 
LEMMA 5.1 
1. I f  B, f ~-PL" g and B, ~ f ~-pL n g, then B ~-PL" g" 
2. (Reverse rule) The following assumption-discharging rule holds. 
f 
[,EMMA 5.2 
1. if B, al, ot 2 I"-eL. f, then B, ot ~-PL" f 
2. if B, [31 ~-el~" f and B, [32 ~-eL, f,  then B, [3 F-eL, f 
Now, we can develop the natural deduction method for the QML 
analytic systems on the classical deduction basis. We call a deduction or 
derivation in a box as a subordinate deduction (or just subdeduction). To 
develop the natural deduction method for the QML systems, we need 
another kind of box. The original kind of box represents the subdeduction 
under some assumptions, while the new kind of boxes represent a subde- 
duction in a possible world. Since our possible worlds are connected by a 
fuzzy accessibility relation, we must be able to reflect the strength of the 
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connection between two worlds. We say a word w' is c-accessible (resp. 
c+-accessible) from the world w iff R(w,w' )  > c (resp. R(w,w' )  > c). 
Thus, we have two types of boxes in the QML natural deduction sys- 
tems. The type 1 boxes are just those of the classical natural deduction 
system. The type 2 boxes are labeled by c or c ÷ where c ~ [0,1]. 
Intuitively, the deduction process proceeding in a possible world, while 
entering a type 2 box labeled with c or c ÷ means to start a deduction in a 
new possible world that is c-accessible or c+-accessible from the original 
world. Type 1 boxes and type 2 boxes are distinguished by their labels. If a 
box has no label, then it is a type 1 box; otherwise, it is a type 2 box. 
When we are making deductions in a possible world, we may want to 
jump to another world to make some deductions. There are at least two 
ways to do this. The first choice is to make deductions in a generic world 
that is c-accessible from the present world for some c. When returning 
from the new world, we get some general results about any worlds that are 
c-accessible from the present world, and the results are used in the present 
world to deduce other results. The other choice is to do the same thing in 
a particular world, and if we can derive some contradiction i the particu- 
lar world, then the contradiction can be returned to the present world. 
Thus, two styles of QML natural deduction systems are induced. If the 
former approach is adopted, the obtained system is the so-called A-style 
natural deduction system. If we follow the latter approach, the resultant 
system is called I-style system. We will discuss the two styles of systems in 
the following subsections. 
5.1. I-Style Natural Deduction System 
The I-style natural deduction systems for K, D, and T include all 
inference rules of the classical natural deduction system. However, any 
rules involving boxes (i.e., the iteration rule and the /3 introduction rules) 
refer only to the type 1 boxes. Thus, we must develop some rules for type 2 
boxes. The following is a complete list of the common rules for 1-style 
natural deduction K, D, and T systems: 
1. Type 2 box creation rule: if a wff 7r(c) (resp. 7r÷(c)) occurs in the 
course of a deduction, a type 2 box with label c (resp. c ÷) may be 
created. The created box is at the same nest level as the occurrence 
of ~(c) (resp. 7r+(c)), and 7r0(c) (resp. ~-~(c)) is put at the first line 
of the box. 
2. Iteration rules for type 2 boxes: If B is a type 2 box with label c (c+), 
and S is the set of all wffs that occur above B and have the same nest 
level as B. Then any member of K÷(S, 1 - c)(K(S, 1 - c)) may be 
repeated irectly inside B. 
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1. Iteration rule: in a deduction, if f and box B are at the same nest level and f 
occurs above B, then f may be repeated irectly inside the box B. 
2. Contradiction rules: 
3. Elimination rules: 
a elimination rules: 
AE: fag  
f 
g 
-n~E:  
f 
~f  
g 
J_ -7 T 
~f  
f 
fl elimination rules: 
VE: .~f  -~g 
fVg  fVg  
g f 
g g 
VE:  -~( fvg)  ~ DE: -~(f3g) 
-~f f 
~g ~g 
~AE:  f g 
- - ( fAg)  - . ( fAg)  
~g -~f 
DE:  
f ~g 
fDg fDg 
g ~f  
4. Introduction rules: 
a introduction rules: 
AI:  f 
g 
fag  
-~ v I :  _~f ~ ~I: f 
-~g -~g 
-~(f  V g) --7(fDg) 
-.-71: f 
-7-~f 
Figure 3. Natural deduction system for classical logic. 
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/3 introduction rules (assumption discharging rules): 
fvg  fvg  
DI: 
-~ AI: 
-~(f A g) 
fDg f zg  ~f  
Figure 3--Continued 
-~(f ^  g) 
351 
3. Contradiction return rule: if I is derived in a type 2 box, the box 
may be closed off, and _1_ is returned outside. 
4. Contradiction rules: our additional contradiction rules with respec- 
tively the premises -1 [0If, -1 (0>f, [1] +f, and (1 } +f are included. 
Furthermore, we have special rules for the system D and T. The special 
rule for T is directly presented in Figure 4. The special rule for D is as 
follows: one may create a type 2 box labeled with 1 at any point of the 
deduction. For convenience, the first line of the so-created box is q-. 
Schematically, these rules are presented in Figure 4. 
The definition of deduction, proof, and global assumption rule is almost 
same as that for classical logic. However, we require a proof that is a 
deduction in which all boxes (type 1 or 2) have been closed. We use 
B ~-L' f to denote that f has a proof in the I-style system for L under the 
global assumption rule with set B. It is easy to construct he completeness 
of the I-style systems, so we consider it first. 
THEOREM 5.1 Let B be a finite set of wffs and f be a wff. Then B ~L f 
implies B ~--L' f
Proof First, let F=Sub(BU{f} ,  and O={ScF IB~L,  ASP_I_}. 
We will verify that O is a B-compatible L-consistency property. Then, if 
B ~L' f, then { ~ f} ~ O. Otherwise, B ~-L' -~ f D _L, and by D E and the 
reverse rule, we have B ~-L' f after all. Thus, by model existence theorem 
B~Lf .  
To verify that 0 is a B-compatible L-consistency property, we go 
through the following steps. First, the verification of conditions (a) and 
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1. Creation rules: 
2. Iteration rules: 
3. Return rule: 
,r(c)(c > O) ,rr+(c) 
C+: ~ 
f~  K+(S, 1 -c ) (c  > O) f~  K(s, 1 - c) 
C+: 
4. Additional contradiction rules: 
-~[0]f 
g 
5. Special rules for T: 
6. Special rule for D: 
.1_ 
~(O)f [ l ]+f (1)+f 
g g g 
v(c)(c > O) v+(c) 
,-'o(C) ~,~-(c) 
Figure 4. The I-style natural deduction rules for systems K, D, T. 
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(b) follows from Lemma 5.2. Second, condition (c) can be verified by 
using AE, contradiction, and n I rules. 
To verify condition (kl) and (k2), we present only one case of them, and 
the other is similar. Assume c > 0 and It(c) ~ S e O, but K÷(S, 1 - c) 
U {Tr0(c)} ~ ®, then the following is an I-style natural deduction proof of 
B [--L i A S D 2_. 
1. A S ;assumption 
2.1r(c) ;1., A E, 7r(c) • S 
3.S \ {~-(c)} ;1., A E 
C; 4.7r0(c) 
5.K+ (S, 1 -c )  
6. A K+(S, 1 - c) A 7r0(c) 
7. A K+(S, 1 -c )  A 7r0(c) D± 
8. L 
;2., type 2 box creation 
;3., iteration 
;4., 5., A I 
;K+(S, 1 - c) U {~-0(c)} ~ O 
;6., 7., ~ E 
9. ± ; ± return 
IO .ASn± ;1. ,9. ,hi  
Note that line 3. of the deduction is a set of wffs, not just a wff. This is a 
convention to avoid listing all wffs line by line. The kind of convention will 
be used implicitly when writing a natural deduction proof. 
If L = D, to verify that condition (d) is satisfied. Suppose that S ~ t9 
but K+(S,O) q~ O, then we can find an 1-style proof of B t- v A S n ± as 
follows: 
1. A S ;assumption 
2.S ;1., A E 
1: 3.-r ;creation rule for D 
4. K + (S, 0) ;2., iteration 
5. A K+(S,O) D_I_ ;K+(S,0) ~ O 
6.2_ ;4 ,5 ,  DE  
7. ± ; _L return 
8.ASp_I_ ;1 . ,7 . ,h i  
If L = T, condition (t) is verified as follows. Let f e K+(S,0) and 
S u {f} ~ O. We will show that B ~-L' A S n 2-. Because f e K+(S, O) 
implies that f = v~(c) for some c > 0 and v+(c) e S for f = Vo(C) for 
some c > 0 and v(c) e S. Thus, by special rule for T, f is derivable from 
S, and then _L is derivable from S. Finally, once again, the result follows 
by using ~ I rule. 
Furthermore, O is B-compatible because of the global assumption rule. 
[] 
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The soundness of I-style systems is intuitively obvious. However, to 
construct the formal result, we need some more definitions. 
DEFINnnON 5.1 Given an 1-style deduction for the wff f under the global 
assumption B. We can define the set of assumptions alive at line n, A(n), 
for each line of the deduction as follows: 
(i) A(O) = 0 .  
(ii) if line n is a member of B or comes from a earlier lines by one of 
the iteration, contradiction, aI, aE, or BE rules, then A(n) = 
A(n - 1). 
(iii) I f  part of the proof looks like 
(n )5  
(n + 1)f2 
(re)f3 
(m + 1)f4 
where (n) represents hat the line number is n, then A(n + 1) = 
A(n) tO {f2} andA(m + 1) = A(n). 
(iv) if part of the proof looks like 
(n)f~ 
c: (c+:) (n + 1)f2 
(m)f3 
(m + 1)f4 
thenA(n + 1) = fDandA(m + 1) = A(n). 
Note that in each box of a deduction, there are two kinds of assumptions 
alive. The first one is that induced by the creation of a type 1 box, and the 
second one is those imported from the outside. According to the definition 
above, when we enter a type 1 box, the two kinds of assumptions are both 
included in the set of alive assumptions. However, when we enter a type 2 
box, all assumptions outside it are forgotten. Thus, the alive assumption 
set in fact depends on the world in which we are doing deduction. 
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Furthermore, if line (n) and line (m) are at the same nest level, then 
A(n) = A(m) according to the definition. 
In what follows, let L = K, D, or T, and B be a finite set of wffs which 
is used as the global assumption set of our deduction process. 
LEMMA 5.3 (conditional validity lemma) Let P be a proof in 1-style 
natural deduction system with B as the global assumption set, and M = 
(W, R, TA) be a finite model in L such that ~M B. Then for each 
w E W, we have w ~ /x A(n) Dffor any line (n)foccurring in P but not 
inside any type 2 boxes. 
Proof We prove the lemma line by line through P inductively. 
Induction basis: assume the first line of P is (1)f. Then it must be 
the cases that f~B or f is an assumption. If f~B,  then w~M f 
since ~M B, so the result follows since A(1) = Q. If f is an assumption, 
then it is the first line of the outermost ype 1 box, and by definition 
A(1) = {f}, so the result holds. 
Induction step: assume that for all lines whose number k :g n and not 
inside any type 2 boxes, we have w ~M /x A(k) ~ f. To prove the result 
holds for line (n). Since line (n) is not in any type 2 box, there are four 
cases to be considered as follows: 
1. if line (n)f is derived by one of the a introduction rules, a elimina- 
tion rules, /3 elimination rules, contradiction rules, type 1 iteration 
rule, or special rules for T from some premise lines (ml)fl and 
(m2)f2 (if the rule is one-premise rule, then only (m l) is needed), 
then by definition, A(m i) c_ A(n)(i = 1, 2) where the containment is
proper in the case of iteration rule. Since (n) is not inside any type 
2 boxes, and (ml), (m 2) are either at the same nest level as (n) 
or is outside the type 1 box containing (n), then (ml), (m 2) are not 
inside any type 2 boxes, either. Thus, the induction hypothesis mplies 
w k~ /xA(m i) 3f i  for i = 1,2, and this in turn implies w ~M AA 
(n) 3f /  for i = 1, 2. Now, we can check all the above-mentioned 
rules to see that w ~M fl /x f2 D f, so the result follows. 
2. If (n)f is the first item of a type 1 box as follows: 
(n  - 1 ) f '  
then A(n) = A(n - 1) U {f}, so w ~M /x A(n) Df. 
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3. if (n) f  is derived by the /3 introduction (i.e. assumption discharging) 
rules as follows: 
(k + 1)f2 
. 
(n - 1)f3 
(n ) f  
then by induction hypothesis, w ~M ^  A(n)  ^  f2 ~ f3 since A(n - 
1) = A(k + 1) = A(k)  U {7"2} = A(n) u {f2}. Note that these equa- 
tions are derived from the facts that (k) and (n) are at the same nest 
level, and (k + 1) is the first line of a type 1 box while (n - 1) is the 
last line of the same box. Thus, w ~M A A(n) ~ (-~ f2 V f3). This 
implies the result since all assumption discharging rules have the 
form so that f = -~ f2 v f3 is valid in classical logic. 
if (n) I is returned from a type 2 box as follows: (the c + case is 
similar) 
(i)~r(c) 
c: (k + 1)Tr0(c) 
(n - 1) ± 
(n) & 
Note that the last line of a type 2 box must be ± since the only return 
rule for it is the contradiction return rule. We will show that w g:M /x A(k). 
This in turn implies w ~M AA(n)D _1_ since A(k)=A(n) .  Assume 
w ~M A A(k), and let the type 2 box under consideration be B. Then by 
induction hypothesis, we have w ~M A A(k)  ~ w(c) since (i) and (k) are 
at the same nest level. Thus w ~M 7r(c). Since M is a finite model, we can 
find a world w' such that R(w, w') > c and w' ~ ar0(c). This also implies 
w' ~M A A(k + 1) ~ zr0(c). Now, we can consider the box B as an inde- 
pendent deduction process except that the type 2 iteration rules may 
import wffs into it. Thus, we can restart he proof of the lemma from the 
first line of B recursively to prove that w' ~M A A(j)  ~ f for each line 
( j ) f  in B but not inside any other type 2 boxes except hose lines imported 
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by the type 2 iteration rules. However, if line ( j ) f  is imported from the 
outside of B, then f ~ K+(S, 1 - c), where S is the set of all wffs above B 
and at the same nest level as it. Since w ~M A A(k)  and all wffs in S are 
at the same nest level as line (k), we have w ~M S by induction hypothe- 
sis. This in turn implies w' ~M f. Thus w' ~M A A(j)  3 f  for each line 
( j ) f  in B but not inside any other type 2 boxes. In particular, w' ~M /x 
A(n - 1) ~ 1.  However, A(n - 1) ---A(k + 1) = • since all assumption 
introduced in B have been discharged before line (n - 1), so w' ~M ± 4 
This is a contradiction, thus the assumption that w ~M /x A(k)  is false. 
That is, w ~M A A(k). [] 
According to the lemma, we can construct the soundness result. 
THEOREM 5.2 Let B be a set of wffs and f be a wff. Then B ~-i2 f implies 
B~Lf. 
Proof By the preceding lemma, in particular, consider the last line of 
the proof. Assume (n) f  is the last line of the proof B ~-L' f ,  since in a 
natural deduction proof for the I-style system, all boxes have been closed, 
line (n) does not occur in any type 2 boxes, and since all assumptions have 
be en discharged, A(n) = Q, we have B ~VL f by the preceding Lemma. 
Then the desired result follows from Corollary 3.1. [] 
5.2. A-style Natural Deduction System 
The A-style natural deduction system still contains the classical deduc- 
tion rules. It also use two types of boxes. The classical rules involve only 
type 1 boxes, whereas the rules for type 2 boxes are different from those 
for the 1-style system. 
The differences between the A-style system and the I-style system are 
listed as follows: 
1. The (type 2 box) creation rule: a type 2 box with label c(0 < c < 1) or 
c+(0 < c < 1) may be created at any point of the proof. For con- 
venience, the first item of the created box is T. 
2. The (type 2 box) return rule can be drawn schematically as follows: 
¢: 
v~(1 - c) 
C + 
Vo(1 - e) 
v +(1 - c) v(1 - c) 
4Note that the rules forbid that a box is closed before all boxes inside it are closed. 
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3. the special rule for D is as follows: 
[o]+f 
(1)f 
The other rules, including the type 2 box iteration rules, contradiction 
rules, and the special rules for the system T, are completely the same as 
those of I-style natural deduction system. 
The global assumption rule with set B is defined as above. The defini- 
tion of deduction and proof is also same as that for I-style system. We use 
B ~/,  f to denote that there is a proof of f in the A-style system under 
the global assumption set B. Then the completeness theorem is constructed 
as follows. 
THEOREM 5.3 If B ~L f then B F-LO f 
Proof Let F = Sub(B u {f}). Define 
O= {ScF IBPco  ASD-L}.  
We will verify that O is a B-compatible L-consistency property. Once 
again, the verification work is routine. 
The verification of condition (a), (b), (c), (t), and B-compatibility is same 
as the I-style system. 
To verify that the conditions (kl) and (k2) are satisfied, we show one of 
them as a sample. Assume qr(c) ~ S ~ ® but K+(S, 1 - c) u {~r0(c)} ~ ® 
for some c > O. Then by definition of O, we have B ~- Lo A K+(S, 1 - 
c) A ~0(c) z ±. We can generate a proof of B ~-Lo A S z 3_ from this as 
follows: 
1. A S ;assumption 
2.S ;1., A E 
c: 3.K+(S, 1 - c) ;type 2 iteration rule 
4.7r0(c) 
k3_ 
;assumption 
;proof of A K+(S, 1 - c) A ~r0(c) D 3_ 
;3., 4., type 1 iteration, ~ E 
6. ~ ~o(c) ;4., 5., reverse 
7. ~ ~'(c) ;6., v+(1 - c) return rule 
8. ± ;2., 7., contradiction rule (~(c) ~ S) 
9.AS3± ;1.,8., D I 
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If L = D, to verify condition (d), suppose that S ~ O but K+(S, O) q~ O, 
then the proof of B ~-L, A S 3 ± is as follows: 
1. A S ;assumption 
2.S ;1., A E 
1: 3.-1- ;creation rule for D 
4.K +(S, 0) ;2., iteration 
5.AK+(S,0) ~,l, ;K+(S,0) ~ t9 
6.± ;4 ,5,  zE  
7.f ;6, contradiction 
8.[0]+f ;v + (0) return 
1: 9. ± ;repeat step 3.-6. 
10. ~ f ;9., contradiction 
l l .~(1) f  ;v+(0) return 
12.(1)f ;8., D rule 
13. ± ;11., 12., contradiction 
14.AS3_L ;1.,13, z I  [] 
Finally, the soundness theorem of the A-style system is constructed by 
following an analogous argument as that for I-style system. 
LEMMA 5.4 (conditional validity lemma) Let P be a proof in A-style 
natural deduction system with B as the global assumption set, and M = 
(W, R, TA) be a finite model in L such that ~M B. Then for each 
w ~ W, we have w ~M A A(n) Df for  any line (n)foccurring in P but not 
inside any type 2 boxes. 
Proof The proof is almost same as that for the 1-style system except 
case 4 in which now we have 
¢~ 
(k)f l  
(k + 1) q- 
(n - 1)v~(1 - c) 
(n)v+(1 - c) 
In terms of that proof, if w ~m A A(k), then we can show that w' ~M f 
for each world w' such that R(w, w') > c and each wff f imported into 
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the type 2 box B. Thus, for each world w' such that R(w, w') > c, we have 
w' ~M ~- (1 -  c), and this implies w ~M ~,+(1- c). Therefore, we 
have w ~M A A(n) ~ l,÷(1 - c) since again A(n) = A(k). [] 
Following the lemma, the soundness theorem is proved in the same way 
as I-style system, so we just state it without proof. 
THEOREM 5.4 Let B be a set of wffs and f be a wff. Then B F-La f implies 
BNL f. 
6. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
6.1. Summary 
We summarize the main results of this paper in the following theorem. 
THEOREM 6.1 Let B be a finite set of wffs and f be a wff . Then for L = K, 
D, or T, the following statements are equivalent: 
1. B ~t f ( f  is valid in all L-models of B) 
2. B ~vL f ( f  is valid in all finite L-models of B) 
3. B ~-L' f ( f is derivable from B by L-tableau methods) 
4. B b z: f ( f is desirable from B by 1-style natural deduction methods 
for L) 
5. B ~-L, f ( f is derivable from B by A-style natural deduction methods 
for L) 
6.2. Resumption of the Example 
We can now return to Example 1. to see how different proof methods 
are used to derive the expected results. First, we give a tableau proof for it. 
(0.7)r 
[0.6](p A q ~ r) 
(0.7)(p/x q) 
---ar 
pAqDr  
pAq 
P 
q 
~(p  D q) r 
-~p ~q × 
× × 
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Each horizontal ine represents an application of some tableau rule. The 
applied rules from top to bottom are two global assumption rules, one 
zr(0.7) rule, one a rule and two /3 rules respectively. 
Next, we show an I-style natural deduction proof for the same example. 
1.--a (0.7)r 
2.[0.6](p A q ~ r) 
3.(0.7)(p A q) 
0.7: 4.p A q 
5.  "-I r 
16.pAq~r 
7.r 
8.1 
;assumption 
;global assumption 
;global assumption 
;3., type 2 box creation 
; 1., iteration 
; 1., iteration 
;4., 6., D E 
;5., 7., contradiction 
9. ± ; ± return 
10(0.7)r ;1.,9.,Reverse (Lemma 5.1) 
Finally, on A-style natural deduction proof is given by modifying the 
I-style proof slightly. 
1.--1 (0 .7 )  r ;assumption 
2.[0.6](p A q ~ r) ;global assumption 
3.(0.7)(p A q) ;global assumption 
0.7: 4. T ;type 2 box creation 
5. ~ r ;1., iteration 
6.p A q ~ r ;1.,iteration 
7 .~(p  Aq)  ;5,6., DE  
8.~(0.7)(p A q) ;v+(0.3)return ule 
9. _1_ ;3., 8., contradiction 
10.(0.7)r ;1.,9.,Reverse 
6.3. Re lated Works  
In this section, we consider some related work on modal approach to 
uncertainty reasoning. 
First, Dubois et al. [8] give an intriguing semantic account of possibilistic 
logic based on incomplete states of knowledge, and they also suggest he 
graded modal operators t~ c and Oc, that are roughly equivalent o our 
[1 - c] + and (c). However, their semantic unit is a complete or incom- 
plete state of knowledge, so the accessibility relation between two states 
means the precisiation relation, whereas according to the discussion in 
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section 2.2., our accessibility relation (i.e., the collection of all R w) means 
the total epistemic states. 
Second, Farinas del cerro and Herzig [5] also formulate possibility logic 
as a multimodal logic PLt,, where P is a finite subset of [0, 1]. PLp is 
essentially equivalent to our system D. However, there is no completeness 
result for PLp being established. Furthermore, they define a conditional 
formula f>_g to denote II(f)>_ lI(g) and show that f>__g can be 
translated into a wff of PL e. However, the given translation is not 
truth-preserving. That is, it is possible that f >_ g is false but the resultant 
wff is true. 
Third, Catach [12] considers ome axiomatic schemata for general multi- 
modal logics. Though his results can be applied to different intensional 
logics, such as epistemic, doxastic, temporal, dynamic logics and their 
combination, however, it seems that he only allows a finite set of atomic 
modal operators and then forms other modal operators from this finite set 
by composition and union. On the other hand, in QML, we have a set of 
modal operators whose cardinality is ~1, so his results cannot be applied to 
our case directly. 
Finally, in probabilistic logic, there are some similar approaches, notably 
that of Fagin and Halpern [13]. However, due to the additivity of probabil- 
ity measure, it seems difficult to develop a complete proof method for 
modal probability logic other than the axiomatic system. 
6.4. Future Directions 
Although the presentation of the paper has almost reached the end, this 
is by no means the termination of the QML research. There is still work 
remaining, and we list some possible research directions of QML. 
First, the proof methods for analytic systems hould be implemented to 
test the efficiency of the methods. We consider the natural deduction 
methods as the most easily implemented since the box structure of natural 
deduction methods is very like the block structure of computer program 
language. However, the tableau method may be more efficient since the 
backward reasoning characteristic of it guarantees the convergence of 
an attempted proof. Of course, our inference rules are essentially non- 
deterministic, so some heuristics and control strategies for proof-tree 
search should first be developed. Furthermore, other styles of proof meth- 
ods may also be considered, such as the resolution method [14] and matrix 
proof method [15]. 
Second, we should consider the extension of QML to predicate logic. 
This will enhance the expressive power of our language. However, the 
proof methods and completeness will become far more complicated than 
the present case. 
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Third, QML is essentially a kind of intensional logic [16], so it is possible 
to combine QML with other intensional ogics. In particular, we will be 
interested in the combination of QML with temporal ogic [17] and with 
epistemic logic [18]. A logic for reasoning about knowledge and probability 
has been successful developed by Fagin et al. [13]. Therefore, we believe 
the combination of QML with epistemic logic and with temporal ogic will 
produce more fruitful results due to the intensional feature of QML. 
Finally, the logic program paradigm for QML may be considered. The 
extensions of logic programming to including modal logic [19] or possibilis- 
tic logic [20] have been explored by some researchers respectively. It seems 
that QML may provide a framework to integrate the two extensions. 
Of course, other research directions are also possible, and we can- 
not enumerate all of them here. We just emphasize once again that the 
analogy between possibilistic and modal reasonings will provide very fruit- 
ful results for uncertainty reasoning research. Since 1912 when C. I. Lewis 
[21] opened the door to the modern modal logic, it has been about eighty 
years, while possibilistic logic is at most in its teens. The links between 
them revealed by QML show that the trace of growth of the old discipline 
may provide much experience and insight into the younger one. 
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